Page 23 - Studio International - December 1970

The work of art fairer idea of the varieties of activity to which about various particular manifestations of
our concept of activity must be adequate. We modern art. But in this lecture, which in-
as object make jokes as well as make plans: we make augurates the series, I want to look at the
matter rather more generally, and therefore
decisions, and we also make scenes: and in
none of these cases does it seem to me that I shall ask you to consider with me a theory of
either the concept of activity, or the more modern art. The theory I have in mind is not
Richard Wollheim specific concept of making, are extended the only theory at work in modern art, but I
beyond their proper limits or employed in a would claim that it is the dominant theory. In
metaphorical manner. this way, its explanatory value, or that part
However, though much is unclear about the of the art of our time which it can account for,
notion of activity, one thing seems clear. is quite a bit larger than one might think. For
From the fact that art is something that we insofar as that art is not an expression of this
do, it follows that art is, in some further and theory, it tends to be a reaction against it.
perhaps philosophically more technical, sense, I can conceive of a number of objections that
intentional. And this further sense is best might be raised to talking of a theory of
brought out in the claim that in the making of modern art, indeed, more generally, to talking
art a concept enters into, and plays a crucial of a theory of art. I shall not be able, you will
THIS IS A REVISED VERSION OF A LECTURE
role in, the determination of what is made; or, appreciate, to take on these objections front-
DELIVERED ON NOVEMBER 4, 1970, AT THE
to put it another way, that when we make a ally, and I suggest that the best thing I can
GARDNER CENTRE FOR THE ARTS, UNIVERSITY
work of art, we make it under a certain des- do is to try to give some indication why I think
OF SUSSEX, AS THE FIRST IN A SERIES ON 20TH-
cription — though, of course, unless our atten- that it is reasonable to look for and talk about
CENTURY ART, ENTITLED `TIME AND THE ARTS
tion is drawn to the question, we may not be a theory of the art of this age or that age—for
TODAY'
in a position to give the description. instance, of modern art, as happens today.
The arguments for thinking that every activ- And, in my efforts at justification, I shall draw
ity—except, perhaps, for a class that we may upon what I have so far said.
need to mark off as primitive or basic actions, If I am right in what I have been saying, then
to which none of this applies—the arguments in the making of any work of art a concept is
for thinking that every activity involves a operative. It is not simply that in describing a
concept are varied, and I can only enumerate work of art 'after the event', we use concepts
them. First, that an activity cannot be en- to characterize them or catch their character-
gaged in, except inadvertently, unless the istics: but the concepts have already been at
agent possesses the concept of that activity: work in the artist's mind in the determination
If we wanted to say something about art that a man could not boil an egg, say, unless he of these characteristics. Indeed, one criterion
we could be quite certain was true, we might knew what it was to boil an egg. Secondly, of a description's adequacy is that in it the
settle for the assertion that art is intentional. two different activities might for some part of concepts that have helped fashion the work
And by this we would mean that art is some- their course coincide in what they ask of the reappear. In this way, the description of the
thing we do, that works of art are things that agent; nevertheless, there is reason to think work is parasitic upon the description under
human beings make. And the truth of this that, over this part, the agent is engaged in which it was made.
assertion is in no way challenged— though one activity rather than another, and the Now so far, it is true, I have been singularly
some preferred analyses may be put in doubt— answer, which one it is, is supplied by the unspecific about what I have had in mind in
by such discoveries, some long-known, others description under which he acts. So boiling referring to the conceptual contribution to the
freshly brought to light, as that we cannot an egg and making tea coincide for the early art activity. I have left it open whether it is
produce a work of art to order, that improvis- part of their course, yet, even while the agent the concept of art itself that is invariably
ation has its place in the making of a work of is still waiting for the water to come to the involved, and whether, if it is, it is only it that
art, that the artist is not necessarily the best boil, we can say, and so can he, which of the is involved, or whether in most cases there are
interpreter of his work, that the spectator too two he is doing. Thirdly, an agent may, of not more determinate concepts, such as that
has a legitimate role to play in the organiza- course, simply fail to do what he sets out to do. of a particular historical style, or that of a
tion of what he perceives. However, given that he succeeds, he may do type of art-object or genre, or that of some
Precisely what is involved in saying of some- so because of what he sets out to do, alterna- finite intention, that are also involved. And
thing that it is a thing we do and not a thing tively he may succeed (once again, I use this the truth is, presumably, that on any given
that merely occurs, how exactly we are to phrase) inadvertently—for instance, after he occasion, or in the case of any given work,
analyse the concept of an activity, are complex has given up trying or in the course of doing there will be more than one concept involved,
and difficult issues in the philosophy of mind. something else. And the difference between and the concepts that are involved will form
I shall disturb them as little as possible, but the two forms of success may be explicated by some kind of hierarchy, with some concepts
one general warning seems in order. And that reference to the efficacy or non-efficacy of a falling under others, either more or less
is that the dangers in analysing the concept certain concept as far as what is brought organized. Now, it is in the existence of such a
lie largely on the side of taking too exacting about. Finally, divergences in the way in conceptual hierarchy, regulative in the pro-
or rigorous a view of the matter : so that when, which the concept of the activity is under- duction of works of art that we find, I main-
for instance, we think of painting as an acti- stood—or disagreement as to the nature of the tain, the justification for talking of a theory
vity, we are likely to presume too much of the activity—can lead to differences in the way in of art.
painter—too much, that is, in the way of which the activity is carried out. Or to put the To such a suggestion two objections might be
conscious intention, of preconception, of fore- matter the other way round; deviance or raised, and I shall try to fill out my suggestion
knowledge, of direct and articulated control, eccentricity of behaviour can be explained by through a consideration of them. The first
at the various stages in his manufacture of the differences in conceptual grasp. A point to objection would be this: If we take the con-
object. The corrective to this tendency, as in which we shall substantively return. cept under which a work of art or a set of
similar cases, is to broaden the range of cases works of art—for instance, those conforming
under review, so that we have a better and a In this series of lectures, you will hear much to a style—have been produced, we may