Page 26 - Studio International - May 1971

Keith Arnatt I have decided to go to the fulfilled (not even if the non-fulfilment is
Tate Gallery next Friday voluntary), nor yet merely because the utterer
does not expect it to be fulfilled; but only on
`To decide to perform an action Xis partly to the grounds that the expression of the intention
perform an intention to do X. A necessary is not meant.' **
condition of the agent's deciding at time ti to `It seems to mark off the concept of intention
do X at time t2 is that the agent may not have had that when we contradict a man's statement of
the intention of doing X for a certain period of his intention we call him—in effect, maybe in
time prior to ti. A second necessary condition good humour, and except in very special cases—a
of his having decided at ti to do X at t2 is that liar; for in the usual sort of case we do not
during a period of time after ti he intends to do suppose that a man is or even can be mistaken
X at t2. But these necessary conditions do not about his intentions. But another mark of the
together form a sufficient condition of deciding concept of intention is that a man can lie about
to do X. For an agent can come at ti to have, them.'* * *
and can continue for a period of time to have,
the intention of doing X at t2 without having * Jack W. Meiland, The Nature of Intention.
decided to do X at t2. What further conditions * *A. Kenny, Action, Emotion and Will.
must the formation of an intention satisfy in * * * Brice Noel Fleming, 'On Intention',
order that that formation of an intention count Philosophical Review, Vol. LXXIII 1964.
as a decision ?'*
`Deciding to do X seems to be closely related 26.3.71
to deliberation. It seems that nothing can count
as a decision to do X unless the agent has
deliberated about doing X. So it is possible that
the three conditions consisting of: (i) the two
necessary conditions of deciding to do X which
are mentioned in the above paragraph; (2) the
agent's having deliberated about doing X; (3)
the agent's having formed the intention to do X
as a result of having deliberated about doing X,
are each a necessary condition of and together
form a sufficient condition of the agent's having
decided to do X.'*
—the only step in deciding is the formation of
an intention after deliberation takes place.There
is no additional step named "deciding" occurring
between the deliberation and the formation of
the intention which is distinct from the
formation of the intention and which then
brings about or results in the formation of the
intention. Deciding to do X is identical with
the formation of an intention to do X.'*
The statement, 'I have decided to go to the
Tate Gallery next Friday', would then, in this
context, be synonymous with the statement, 'I
intend to go to the Tate Gallery next Friday'.
It is the expression of an intention where the
intention formed is the result of deliberation.
Meiland says, 'statements of the form "I
intend ..." are either true or false.'* If I say
that I intend to do X and I do in fact intend to
do X, then my statement of intention is true;
if I do not intend to do X, my statement of
intention is false. However, some philosophers
would wish to say that statements of fact differ
in regard to certain logical features from
statements which express intention; they would
say that statements expressing intention are
either sincere or insincere.
`Ha man sincerely utters a statement which
fails to accord with the facts then he is mistaken;
if he utters ... an expression of intention, then
he is not mistaken merely because the facts do
not accord with his utterance.'**
`The expression of an intention in the form
of a statement about the future is condemned
as a lie not on the grounds merely that it is not
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