Page 46 - Studio International - May 1972

The paradox of adn as identical with 'art'. The present argument is a is art.
The final paradox is the paradox of the divided second intentional form intending the
entity; adn and 'ads' which, whilst discussed in intentional 'art'. Where the blank represents the 'art-member'
first intention are identical, are on different It is questionable whether or not the which is implicitly proposing the definition.
levels of discourse; i.e. adn discusses 'adn' in argument is capable of study in itself (it is The explicit definition of art is such as :
a semantical metalanguage. The paradox questionable whether or not any logical forms
results from the necessity for self-referential are capable of study in themselves). For an art is
consistency and an allegiance to the Theory answer a fundamental distinction between
of Types. The sole reconciliation of the thus intentional and non-intentional entities is Where the blank is represented by an
stated prerequisites exists in the dichotomy. required and for present purposes the distinction `intentional concept' such as is here expressed in
Thus to maintain consistency in set-theoretical is equivalent to that between formal and the present argument. In other words, this
terms (as well as in semantical terms) 'adn' is instrumental signs. To discuss the argument in argument can only bear a relationship to art in
defined as the sole member in the class 'art' itself is to assign it the function of an its intentional form (this is a relationship of
of art-entities. In this way the definition instrumental sign, i.e. a sign which signifies its identity). In 'ads' a unit set was postulated for
defines explicitly art and explicitly the relation significatum by virtue of some human the class 'art' of all artworks. Here—seemingly
of 'adn' to art and thus explicitly the constitution convention. In other words the sign must first outside the domain of set theory and including
of its art-status. The paradox remains, however, be apprehended in itself before its significatum mere intentions —it is enough to say that there
essentially unresolved and so with it the is apprehended; a formal sign however can be no multiplicity of 'art's. There is only
previous paradoxes. An implicit paradox signifies its significatum by virtue of the natural one art and art-entities are only of concern as
persists in what is presupposed as art and what properties of the sign itself. This practice of second intentional entities.
is defined as art in adn— namely the sole treating essentially formal signs as The question might arise as to why there
membership of 'adn' in art. The final implicit instrumental signs is a result of an inadequate should be a relationship of identity between the
paradox is in some ways similar to Duchamp's distinction between the intentional and the intentional form of this argument and its
paradox in operating upon presupposition: the `real', and all but the most recent mathematical intention 'art'. The answer is availed in the
difference is in the use of explicit definitions logic has not formulated any such distinction nature of formal signs, i.e. the intentional form
of art and explicit means of establishing its (holding that it is the study of pure form). as a formal sign must be identical with its
status with respect to art. So it is thought to be methodologically intention. The intentional form of the
It is the last paradox (of adn) to which the invalid to formally discuss the argument in a argument is inevitably tautologous (or, if you

following argument is addressed as a means to a metalanguage which is to treat it as a 'real' like, analytic); 'art' is said to be 'what art is'.
resolution of this and thus of the other entity. If such discussion were permitted by The value of such an argument would be in
paradoxes. virtue of there being nothing intentional the degree to which it discloses art or 'what art
in this second-order language a further is in essence'. Once 'art' in intention is established
Towards a Resolution metalanguage would be set up, and so on. as the subject matter of such an argument and
A proper resolution of the paradox of the However whilst it might seem that an infinity whilst remembering that such an argument
divided entity must in itself be self- of languages and logics is inevitable, this is not must pertain to a relationship of identity to
referentially consistent and thus make explicit so because none of the languages contain the intentional 'art' to remain an intentional
its status with respect to art. The resolution anything intentional : thus the languages form, it is necessary to discuss what art can be
must be based upon a clear distinction between cannot be called formal. As Veatch has said : in essence when its essence is established by
the logical and the 'real', and must exemplify `Hit is logic that one is concerned with, then it such an argument. In other words art must be
its intended relationship between 'art' in second would seem that any account of the nature and examined aside from what have been the
intention and its manifestations or entities. character of logical or second intentional particulars from which the universal 'art' is
The present viewpoint will not adhere to the entities in general should pertain to those very established by abstraction, i.e. apart from
notion of an infinity of metalanguages (or an logical entities which one has used to develop presupposition. No such art-entities or
infinity of logics) for reasons to be stated later. one's account of logic itself.' (Henry Babcock particulars of art are admitted (this examination
The temptation is to discuss this for example in Veatch, Intentional Logic, New Haven, 1970.) should not be retrospectively descriptive but
terms of 'real' art-entities, and whilst self- Another way to view the transition from prescriptive and by its very nature self-
referential consistency will be maintained (in dealing with art in extension to dealing with referentially consistent). The concept of 'art'
spite of Russell's 'Theory of Types') there is no art in intention might be in the change in art will later be established as the only possible
need to talk at present of entities at all. In method. The traditional art method has been subject-matter for this argument (where the
other words, whilst it is tempting to see this as seen to conform to an implicit definition of art concept of art is defined as the relation of
solely a part of art it should in fact also be seen such as : identity between the particulars of art and 'art').
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