Page 47 - Studio International - May 1972

If the subject-matter of 'art' is said to be the
intentional 'art' and if no 'real' particulars of
art are admitted but only the intentional form
of an argument such as this, then 'art' might be
• seen to consist of intentional forms —but is this
class 'art' art in reality ? Can a 'real' class
contain second-intentional members ? This
would seem absurd. Individuals in reality are
certainly not rerum naturae members of any
class, i.e. when considered in first intention.
However, it is when considered in second
intention that such individuals attain 'class-
membership', i.e. when these individuals are
related to some universal.
So it seems that all class members and thus
art-members derive their membership from
their second-intentional status. There is no
• implicit reason to differentiate between
intentional and non-intentional forms at this
point, for as far as their status as art-members
goes they are both identically seen as second
intentional.
If the hypothetical succession of art-
. intentions constitute art, what is the status of
the class 'art' ? i.e. is the 'art', here
• disclosed, in essence a being of reason or a 'real'
being or neither ? Supposing it is said that:

is an intentional relationship, the relation of
identity, whilst 2 expresses a relation of
class-membership which is derivative (brought
about through abstraction from i), and is thus
non-intentional. This does not however imply
that it is necessarily 'real'. The unity of the
individual members is not, as has been seen
earlier, 'real' but only by virtue of intellectual
abstraction. Thus the status of 'art' as a
collection of intentions is neither 'real' nor
intentional. It has been stated by Veatch that a
class, rather than being an intention, is merely a
term in an intentional relationship, and this
points squarely to what is the subject matter of explicated.
this argument—the 'concept of art', as previously Whilst a resolution has been proposed, the
defined as the relation of identity between art status of the proposition itself (with respect to
particulars and the universal 'art'. This is thus art) has been made explicit. Thus both an
the properly intentional entity 'art'. Finally it explicit definition of art in terms of the argument
should be noted that to talk about this argument and an explicit account of the art-status of the
(as an art-entity) it must be spoken of as argument is availed. The consequences of so
'non-real' i.e. it would be misleading and dealing with art and its entities is the possibility
irrelevant to speak of the argument in itself, of a multiplicity of art-values (rather than the
but only in connection with its subject matter, strict art/not art dichotomy). Some
because its status as a formal sign would be possibilities in this realm have already been
ignored under these circumstances and would be alluded; the art-status as here suggested would
treated as merely instrumental. It may thus be be the relationship of art to its manifestations. q
spoken of only as an intentional form.
The individuals which are classed as 'art'
have been seen to be second-intentional, whilst
the class 'art' has been seen to be a term in a
more important relation which is properly
intentional. The latter is the intentional entity
intended by this argument—the 'concept of
art' (in set terminology, the relationship
between the individuals of a set and the set).
Thus what is properly the subject matter is

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