Page 52 - Studio International - March April 1975
P. 52

through which we generally live today.
        Sculpture, to achieve existence in the
        world as thing, must be present in itself.
        It must not, primarily, re-present anyone
        or anything outside itself. This is not to
        dismiss representation as having been of
        no importance to sculpture. But I would
        argue that the central function of the
        recognizable image, wherever it has
        appeared in sculpture, has been as a
        vehicle between the sculpture and the
        onlooker. It has carried the experience of
        the sculpture-as-thing into the onlooker's
        habitual expectation of reality. The
        newness, the unexpectedness, of each
        separately created thing could only be
        tolerated when mediated through the
        expectedness of human or animal forms.
          Secondly, the figure makes the thing
        visible. It gives it a front and a back, a
        defined boundary, a specific spatial
        orientation. It focuses and directs the
        onlooker's attention. It is in this sense
        alone that the residual role of the figure
        is of importance to sculpture now, and I
        want to develop this theme in our next
        discussion.
          I think we have now focused and
        isolated two notable characteristics of
        sculpture as thing-in-itself. I mean its
        stability and its visibility. The first of
        these characteristics sculpture shares with
        all created things : the second is peculiar
        to sculpture among things and, I will
        argue, its one central quality.
          As we found last time, things stand
        differently in the world from humans.
        The permanence of things, among which
        sculpture is counted, is not the historic
        permanence — the "immortality" — of
        sculpture. It is simply this, that things,
        standing-in-themselves, retain visible
        constancy denied to humans, whose
        "mortality" consists not only in the
        inevitability of death, but in the
        inevitable departure of each moment,
        enforcing a continual change on each
        living subject and of his view of the
        world. Things need survive long enough
        only to assure humans of the constancy
        of their own presence in the world. 'It
        is this durability,' Hannah Arendt writes,
        "which gives the things of the world their
        relative independence from men who
        produced and used them, their
        "objectivity" which makes them
        withstand, "stand against", and endure, at
        least for a time, the voracious needs and
        wants of their living makers and users.
        From this standpoint the things of the
        world have the function of stabilizing
        human life, and their objectivity lies in
        the fact that — in contradiction to the
        Heraclitean saying that the same man can
        never enter the same stream ( ? twice) —
        men, their ever-changing nature
        notwithstanding, can retrieve their
        sameness, that is, their identity, by being
        related to the same chair and the same
        table.'
          It is the stability and sufficient
        permanence of things that leads Rilke to
        speak of them as belonging to an order
        above that of the human and animal
        world, in the quotation from the Rodin
        lecture I used earlier; and later, in the
        Ninth Duino Elegy: 'These things that
        live only in passing, understand that you
        praise them; fugitive, they look to us the
        most fugitive for rescue.' Men and things   Rodin jean d'Aire, nude c. 1889. Bronze, 83 x 27 x 24½ in. Rodin Museum

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