Page 52 - Studio International - June 1971

The art-lesson i. The title of this lecture stands in need of For Wittgenstein the fundamental problem
explanation: no less because it means just what posed by the nature of language—and perhaps
Richard Wollheim it says. My topic this evening is the art-lesson: a this is so generally for philosophers, thereby
period of time, or a portion of a course of distinguishing them from others, and there are
instruction, in which art is taught. That is what many others, who also have a theoretical
I want to talk about. interest in language—is how to account for the
But I am aware that I may have clarified my particular amalgam in which language consists :
subject only at the risk of making my how to account for it, how to interpret it, or
motivation seem obscure. For to some of you, perhaps just how to describe it. For to the
most of you, it might seem quite implausible hurried eye, language offers the prospect of two
that I should have chosen to come and talk on distinct elements which somehow or other have
this subject to such a place at such a time: that got stuck together. The fact that they have got
is, to a school of drawing and painting, and at a stuck together is to their mutual benefit—as well
moment in history when the formal teaching of as, of course, to the inestimable advantage of
art has been quite widely abandoned and mankind: nevertheless, the principle of union,
everywhere feels itself in difficulty. I would say, the glue, remains a mystery. And, as we shall
myself, that these facts in no way make my see in a moment, differing views about how the
choice of subject implausible, though they might the two elements are united will also have the
well make it rash. In my rashness I have been effect of throwing the nature of each in doubt.
sustained by two general considerations, both of And differing views about the nature of each
which weigh heavy with me. Let me present will, of course, mean differing views about the
them to you. nature of the whole that they constitute—that is,
differing views about language.
The text of the first Maurice de Sausmarez 2. The first consideration comes from The two elements in which language consists
Memorial Lecture, given at The Byam Shaw philosophy. It is this : In his later philosophy can initially be identified in this way : There is,
School of Painting and Drawing, London, on Ludwig Wittgenstein came increasingly to one, the word or words, two, meaning. And here
Thursday, March 18,1971, by Professor Richard discuss a phenomenon which, I think it would are two typical views of how the two elements
Wollheim, Grote Professor of Philosophy of be true to say, had never been regarded, at any are stuck together.
Mind and Logic in the University of London, rate explicitly, by previous philosophers as Language consists essentially in words.
introduced by Professor Sir William Coldstream, particularly or specifically a philosophical topic : Words are things that we utter or write down or
Principal of The Slade School of Art, London. and that phenomenon is the way in which we say to ourselves. There are, however, rules
learn or are taught language. Of course, the which relate these words to things or bits of
phenomenon had been talked of by other things in the world. It is these rules that secure
philosophers : in the writings of (say) Plato, meaning for our words, and they secure it in that
St Augustine, Locke, Russell (to name just a the meaning of a word is whatever is related to it
few), there are references to the way in which by such a rule. Accordingly, once the rules have
language is transmitted, and many of the things been established, then, in uttering or writing
that these philosophers find to say are of great down or saying to ourselves a word, we thereby
interest: but it was left to Wittgenstein to see, speak about something. The core of this first
with a distinctness that was not open to his view might be put by saying, When we use
predecessors, the true significance of the words, we find ourselves meaning something or
phenomenon and in consequence the central other, or, We mean what our words mean.
place that it could reasonably assume, or Quite opposed to this view is a second view,
perhaps must assume, within philosophy. How which totally rejects the idea that the essence of
this came about concerns us. language lies in the word-element. Mere words
It was nothing new for Wittgenstein to be do not, do not even begin to, make up language.
interested in language. On the contrary, the Words, whether uttered out loud, or written
nature of language, where language is conceived down, or said to oneself, are in themselves
of as, roughly, the essential medium of thought, inert, and to be otherwise they must have life
had long been Wittgenstein's central breathed into them from some accompanying
philosophical concern, and the shift or the volition or thought. It is this volition or thought
expansion in interest occurred when he came to on the part of the language-user, on our part,
realize that a proper understanding of the way that allows words to refer to something in the
in which we learn or are taught language, a full world. Meaning is in the first instance an
reflection upon what is involved, will give us an experience—a reaching out of the mind towards
insight into the nature of language of a kind not something presented to it—and the essence of
attainable by any other means. Such reflection language lies in this experience. The core of this
will at one and the same time lead us to reject view might be put by saying, When we use
certain false views of language, some of which words, we express what we mean, or, Our words
hold a vast fascination for us, and ease our mean what we mean.
passage to a true view of language: though, as a We might bring out the difference between
characteristic complication, Wittgenstein would the two views by seeing what they would make
seem always to have remained of the opinion of a very simple linguistic occasion. For
that, whereas the various false views of language instance, here and now, dressed as I am, I say,
can be stated or lend themselves to assertion, the `My jacket is brown'. On the first view, to get at
true view is something that has to be seen—it the essence of the occasion, it is necessary for us,
remains a view. first, to observe the words that have been used,

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