Page 55 - Studio International - June 1971

say no more, is the connection that Wittgenstein me a slab' ? Or are we to say that the meaning of knowledge of language that I have just indicated
believed to hold between the language-lesson what the first man says is contained in—being, before he can learn ostensively, or benefit from
and the nature of language. I characterized this say, a quarter of—the meaning of what the second the language-lesson, does this not entail that,
connection a while back by saying that for man says ? Neither answer seems intelligible, contrary to what I said earlier, teaching by
Wittgenstein a proper understanding of what is and yet we should surely have to settle for one ostension cannot be employed as a technique in
involved in the language-lesson gives us a unique or the other if we thought that meaning was the language-lesson if the language that is to be
insight into the nature of language. I only hope divisible or atomistic in the way that the two learnt is one's native language ? Teaching by
that I have said enough to convince you that this views that Wittgenstein rejects assume. ostension may be a way of teaching a language
is how Wittgenstein saw the connection—and And now we are in a position to turn to what but it isn't a way of teaching language.
perhaps enough to make you sympathize with is Wittgenstein's positive account ofthe language- Now it cannot be said that Wittgenstein
my view, that his seeing it in this way constituted lesson and hence of the nature of language : faces this issue as squarely as he might.
a profound and important discovery. provided, that is, we remember—a point I Nevertheless I think he would think that there is
The second finding, on which I shall spend a mentioned earlier on—that for Wittgenstein an implication to this last question that must be
little more time, though not so much as I surely the idea that such an account could be baldly rejected. And that it must be rejected, and the
would have had to if I had not already spent so stated, in so many words, remained something reason why, will be important considerations
much on what Wittgenstein thought wrong with of an absurdity, and that he was always of the when we come, as we will very shortly, to turn
those views of the language-lesson and of the opinion that with something so intimate and so our attention from language, where it has been
nature of language which he rejected, is what he pervasive as language, the truth is more like held over-long, to art, where by now it belongs.
thought to be the correct view of these matters. what is left when the veils of error have fallen The crucial consideration is this : Teaching
But before embarking on this, just a word more, away. Nevertheless, I think that we could say by ostension could be a method of teaching a
I fear, on the wrong views. that his view amounts to something like this : pupil his native language, even though it
Wittgenstein, as we have seen, had detailed Teaching by ostension is a way of teaching a requires on his part some knowledge of language,
criticisms to make of two views of language, both language. But it is a way of teaching a language if we grant the further possibility that he might
of which hold a natural and, as we might say, a from which only a pupil who already knows acquire this knowledge through being taught by
pre-philosophical appeal. We have been something about language can learn. ostension. For ostension to be successful, certain
considering these criticisms. However, I think Two questions immediately arise. The first is presuppositions must be satisfied. All right. But
it would be right to say that for Wittgenstein this : How much about language must the pupil why should not the pupil discover what these
more important than the criticisms specific to know before he can benefit from being taught by presuppositions are in the course of ostension
each view—though not readily comprehensible ostension ? Of course, the question can't be and so bring it about that they are satisfied ? The
except in the light of these criticisms —is a precisely answered, but I think that the only objection as far as I can see would be if
general criticism, which was common to both necessary equipment he must have can be learning language were an instantaneous process.
views. The two views differ in many ways. But brought under two general headings. The pupil But that it isn't.
they concur in what is, in the last analysis, the must know what it is to follow a rule, for The point is sufficiently important to look at
weakest part of each. Let me find a way of rule-following—where this is encompassed in parallel situations where we may note some such
putting this fundamental error. the purely formal maxim, `Do the same in possibility as I have talked of realized. Consider
Both views treat language as though it could similar circumstances' —lies at the very heart of for instance, the case of so-called direct language
be broken down or analysed into innumerable language. And he must also know—though teaching: where, say, we are taught German and
ordered pairs of elements, each pair consisting without necessarily knowing that he knows— taught it systematically—that is, we are taught
of a word and its meaning—rather like, for how to bring the words that he learns under the its grammar—but we are taught this in German.
instance, the way in which the married most general categories of language. He Who will raise the objection that this process is
population of a country, or at any rate of a must be able to attach to them some such in principle impossible because it requires us
monogamous country, could be analysed marker as 'subject' or 'noun-phrase', first to know what we are then to be taught ? Or—
without remainder into many many couples, alternatively 'predicate' or 'verb-phrase'. Let me perhaps a better example, because a clear
each couple consisting of a husband and his wife. give an example of such knowledge in action. A parallel—might we not learn a game, say a card
That is the sort of picture of language that each man, once again, is being taught the word game, and indeed learn what a card game is—for
view presents. So it looks, according to him, as `brown' ostensively by a teacher who points to assume we had never come across one before—
though learning language is always a matter of the colour of my jacket as an essential part of the through just plunging in and playing it ? Slow
working one's way through these ordered pairs — lesson. Now, if the pupil is to have a chance of processes, you may say—but not beyond the
language-lesson after language-lesson, as it were. learning the meaning of the word as a bounds of possibility.
Now, though it might seem plausible—I shan't consequence of this procedure, he must have Of course, I have said nothing about
say whether it ultimately is correct, because the two capacities. In the first place, he must be precisely how the pupil may learn, through
issue isn't all that straightforward—to think that able to use the word regularly, to apply it (in the being taught by ostension, that which is
language on the word side, as it were, can be case of 'brown') to the same colour. In presupposed if he is to learn from ostension.
analysed into lots of distinct and separately Wittgenstein's phrase he must know how `to go Certainly we must not assume that one process
identifiable words, no plausibility whatsoever on'. Secondly, he must be able to categorise is altogether complete before the other can even
attaches to the thought that the corresponding `brown' so that in its normal employment at any begin. That would be absurd. For instance, it
thing is true of language on the meaning side : rate, it will be used by him not to pick out would be absurd to assume that one could learn
that we can regard meaning as totally divisible, something but to say something of something what a rule of language is save in the context of
with each word carrying its own load of meaning first picked out. He must recognize that the specific rules of language.
on its back. Wittgenstein brings out the error of word is to fill the gap in such frames as 'My As some of you will know, of recent years a
any such view by asking us to consider the jacket is... ' rather than the gap in such frames traditional hypothesis has returned to favour
following case. Someone learns the word 'Slab' as `... is made of suede'. In Wittgenstein's with certain contemporary theorists of language
and uses it to give an order to a fellow-workman. phrase, he must be able to give the word 'its and of human intelligence as a means of
Now, when he says 'Slab' does he mean, or does place in the language game'. accounting for certain universal capacities that
the word he uses mean, exactly the same as what The second question that arises out of we have, and in particular for the capacity of
would be meant by someone who has learnt and Wittgenstein's account of the language-lesson is language. This hypothesis postulates 'innate
uses the more elaborate form of words 'Bring this : If the pupil must have the kind of ideas' to cover or match these remarkable human
281