Page 39 - Studio International - January 1973

Aspects of art education 3

Possible models statements) and often clear up what can be conformable (i.e. sensible) without any
called Knowledge, True Belief, Awareness dependence upon our conceptual scheme of
for propositional and other epistemic notions. Alternatives are things. It is difficult to see how they could have
simply all the possible worlds compatible with a bare particulars as well-defined individuals
attitudes given possible world (or model set (W)) under a unless they held to a positivistic notion of
particular modal operator. In a 'knowing' intersubjectivity. We can say what we obtain
context alternatives would be epistemic with our possible worlds (Kuhn's 'metaphysical
alternatives where all the possible worlds are paradigms' are adequate analogies to model
compatible with what one knows in (W); to say systems — that shows the importance of model
that this is an interpretation of the logical sets and their bounded alternatives, and how
modalities of Lewis is not correct since we have Kuhn's terms can be interpreted in several
I a sort of rule of rejection (like Lukasiewicz's) ways3) governing individuation over an
Wittgenstein, Moore and Ryle (in a employed which restricts all possible relatives objective yet 'unnatural' reality.
quasi-behaviouristic manner), together with to a set and relative to a system of alternatives.1 Difficulty in grasping belief contexts is
contemporary logicians (e.g. Hintikka, Prior, In a doxastic context of true belief alternatives, usually occasioned by a simple empiricism/
Montague etc.) have continued an 'anti- satisfiable to the given model set, need only be behaviourism. Indeed any set of beliefs is
absolutist' strategy towards a priori propositions. one possible world. (It is this last condition of notoriously underdetermined by behaviourism.
The key to an understanding of 'reality', modal possibility that upsets nice clean lines of As a widely used rule of thumb in painting and
`knowledge' and 'belief ' is held to lie in the cross-identification between possible worlds. sculpture studios it is not surprising that
grammar and function of a language rather than This problem upsets a positivistic ontology and ideology are always indeterminate.
in the existence of super-sensible entities, and intersubjectivity of mental life, and it is Ontological relativity can hardly be recognized
the absolutist position of a mystical standard plausible that it can deal with Kuhn's notion of when any 'science' of psychological states of
reified in a Platonic 'museum in the sky'. `crisis' more fully than it has been in the past.) affairs cannot allow for logical or contra-logical
There are a number of different levels of Two claims can be examined . . . the modalities (the tenuous connection between
objections to be found in logical models against compatibility of one's propositional gestalt (or modalities and many-valued logics must be left
the behaviourist (although this term has become model system) when one knows p; and the here). Permission of what could be allowed as
increasingly difficult to make specific). knowing of p when all alternative sets (within alternatives (and as satisfactory imbedding
Generally, the term 'overt behaviour' is held to our system) are compatible. conditions) is granted when epistemic, doxastic
be capable of ranging over all 'mental conduct' Leaving aside the problems of quantifying etc., conditions are outlined.
and 'mental states'. Criticism has usually looked into knowing contexts etc., (opaque contexts) it Gilbert Ryle's logical (or analytical)
at such a position as inadequate (at least) and is not surprising that the result of having true behaviourism provides us with a problematic
dangerous. belief alternativeness is to have an ontological model of 'knowing' which is often used. Briefly,
The poor inference from overt behaviour to relativity between sets — simply by comparing this view has replaced the psychologistic uses of
particular states of mind is apparent in art individual belief contexts (worlds). So it is of no knowing and believing with a dispositional
education. The point will be made that in order surprise that a group cannot agree to whether p status where the verb describes either an
foi the student to be assessed we need access to is the case or not (failure to cross-identify) occurrence or a tendency to occurrences.4
more than his 'performances' on certain when the propositional attitudes are fairly weak (So, belief is seen as the behaviour (if any) which
occasions — to know anything about his work, to modalities, or are of different logical types. The consistently accompanies itself). The danger of
distinguish claims from practice. This question of the priority or the symmetry relying upon overt behaviour as one's only
problem seems to be the lack of (a) the criteria between the individuation of elementary states categorical assertion is that mental acts become
for asserting that he does not know what he is of affairs (Sachverhaltes) and our propositional semi-hypothetical statements which strains
doing (and other analogous modalities to states of affairs is answered by remembering any sort of inference between behaviour and
epistemic logic), (b) the criteria for asserting that if we ponder on what we can know (believe dispositions. That is, Ryle's theory of the
that although he says he knows what he is etc.,) to be the case then we quantify over our categorically overt is supported by
doing he does not know. ideologies rather than over our simple ontology. counterfactuals and future conditionals. What
(`Ideology' can take one of several forms; the we have shown (if anything) is that there can be
II shape depending upon the modal operators and no immediately obvious reason why there
It may appear to be puzzling why our beliefs, alternativeness conditions — this is a much more should be a 'strict' computability between our
knowledge, hopes and other propositional satisfactory treatment of an important notion actual and alternative sets. A Rationality Thesis
attitudes are connected with our performances than talking of dispositions or of causes and depends upon the pragmatical aspects of
of quantification and indentification of effects of psychological states of affairs). modalities. That it is possible to know that one
individuals; and even be objectionable that with The thesis of semantical Neo-Kantianism2 is taking part in a language-game through
explanatory models, with their set conditions, is simply that although we can have a robust ostension is as grave a mistake as those who take
we can say that epistemic and doxastic sense of reality the view that there can be a perception to be an accurate reflection of the
conditions (of 'mental' states of affairs) can (even reasonably) unified domanin of world.
determine not only which sorts of possible individuals independent of what one knows The problems of Skinnerian 'reinforcement'
worlds would be acceptable to us but also what (etc.) is nothing but an unrealistic abstraction. and `reward's are that the reification of
actual possible world we can claim any sort of The Ding an sich cannot be described propositional attitudes is not accessible (for
ontological commitment toward. (individuated) unless it is tied to a particular agreement or disagreement) and the complex
Alternative relations of modalities are propositional attitude and its relevant relations of epistemic (etc.) conditions (and the
important in that they provide at least a rational alternatives. The ontological nudism afforded by implied ontological network) thought to be
(epistemological) Weltanschauung (with its art-educationalists is embarrassingly naive. It is absurd with a classical two-valued logic
purported counterfactual and conditional to be supposed that they believe the world to be (and the implied Tractatus dicta on the
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