Page 40 - Studio International - January 1973

Aspects of art education 3

rationality of the world). normativeness in what we say. A move towards adequate theory of argumentation (an
Prohibition of the analysis of ideological `axiomatizing' our discussions would be a first alternative to the model sets above). We could
commitment to alternative possibilities seems step. posit a class of those having a shared belief:
to be part and parcel of the cause of an inability It is clear from other exercises that an P would be the set of all assertors to be
to have easily relatable conditions of knowing Hegelian reformist approach is preferable to considered in a given context. P1, P2, etc.
(etc.).6 Partly because of a lack of explanatory starting from scratch. We can see in the sciences would be subsets of P. For any assertor x, if x is
models that can capitalize on the sophistication already axiomatized some attractive attempts at an element in Pr, there is a certain set of
of residual meanings — even J. 0. Urmson's what we wish to achieve. (Historically this is propositions all elements of which are asserted
parenthetical verbs are worth looking at simply a more interesting approach since the by all elements of P1. But this is not yet an
because they are not descriptions of (pre-empirical) sciences borrowed the inventio audience. If we define the classes P1 as
performances (cf. Ryle) but are claims to technique of formalization from Roman debate equivalent built upon dependencies between
reasonableness, authoritativeness etc. This is where its role was somewhat like argumentation assertions by stipulating the three orthodox
because of the assumption that types of theory.) logical relations reflexiveness, symmetricality,
locutions such as 'Knowing that one knows' Assertion logic is a special case of modal and transitiveness we come closer to what an
involves a generation of an infinite regress of logic. It is readily comparable with von Wright's audience would be like. The relation is reflexive
separate acts of introspection. This is not the epistemic modalities (it is known that, it is if whenever x asserts p, he asserts it. It is
place to argue for a strong or weak sense of believed that) and other enrichments of Lewis's symmetric if whenever x asserts p, then y (also
knowing yet both are defensible against modal systems. Whatever we do have we would an element of Pi) asserts p, and whenever y
Ryle's arguments since his 'Knowing That' and need to ensure that the assertion logic for our asserts p, x asserts p. The relation is transitive if
`Knowing How' are not analogues of model set discussion-logic be non-extensional because the whenever from the fact that x asserts p it follows
conditions of propositional attitudes. Indeed content of what we say is essential while the that y asserts p follows the fact that z (also an
Ryle's talk of intelligence, apart from being form in which we say it is not. And again the element of Pr) also asserts p, then since x asserts
misguided, comes dangerously close to problem with behaviourism comes in. We can't p it follows that z asserts p. It is necessary to
supporting an ordinary practitioner as if he had accept a Bloomfieldian account of our consider a comprehensive notion of audience
at no time considered whether he was actually illocutionary acts when it is clear that a 'deep' derived from the following definitions :
orthodox, never mind which paradigm or model sense can be made of 'ungrammatical' sentences. (a) The audience of an assertor x for a given
system he ought to belong to. Ryle could be an Another point is that an intentional relation like statement p is the set of all assertors y for which
unfortunate paradigm for the NCDAD.7 `thinking of ' may simply be a sentence which is the following holds : whenever x asserts p, then
about both the thinker and that which is ally assert p. This is the factual audience of x
III thought of. A categorical sentence on the other relative top.
Along with beliefs, wishes and other hand is (strictly) only about just those things (b) The audience of x relative to the statement
propositional attitudes must go intentional comprised in the extension of its subject term. p is the set of all y for which the following
relations and a circumspect interest in debate, Given that with negative universals and holds : x asserts p, and moreover x asserts that if
discussion and theories of argumentation. particular affirmatives this is not a problem if x asserts p, then it ought to be that y asserts p.
Simply, in order to find out how our attitudes one converts predicate and subject terms. But This is the normative audience of x relative to p.
may be altered it is necessary to take something each sentence is strictly about one or the other A weaker version of both (a) and (b) can be
more than empiricism to the outcome of such while two-place predicate intentional relations presented using probability. These would be the
attitudes : or the way we behave. We don't need in sentences are about both subjects. On the factual probabilistic and normative
to get embroiled in (psychological) motivational other hand there are strong reasons put forward probabilistic audiences of x relative to p
antecedents. Nietzsche's point was that we are by Prior9 for not regarding 'X is thinking of respectively. A stronger version could be
compelled to argue with groups that do not share Y' as expressing a relation between 'X and Y'. produced using von Wright's alethic modalities
our own ideological model or mode of thinking. If X is believed by me to exist (but not by instead of material implication. We would then
That compunction is not of interest unless one anyone else) I can think things of X's but this have: strict factual audiences, strict normative
takes the Hobbesian view which motivational would be a problem for those who do not share audiences, strict factual probabilistic
psychology has only tarted up.8 What's of my existential beliefs. One's obviously going to audiences, strict normative probabilistic
interest is the necessary axiomatization and have some different relations with mathematical audiences.
formalization that's going to occur when one propositions. The point is that we can consider the audience
becomes aware of the fundamentals of one's (If all one is interested in is persuasion it of any set of assertors as either the union of their
argument. To this could be added Prior's point: would be presumptuous to ask for individual audiences or the intersection of their
that those who do not share another's existential preliminaries in accepted beliefs from the individual audiences. These intersections will
beliefs are not going to be able to think what audience. We could seek a basis of shared be what is discussed in intentional relations or
those other persons thoughts are. Model beliefs broad enough to support what was more particularly in respect of indexical
audiences are going to be like possible worlds being put across. We would be advised to relations. Something in this area is suggested as
for our assertions. Rather than looking to see appeal to no more a particular or detailed an outcome of the Art Language Index.12 q
which model audience is going to be compatible grounding than is sufficient to gain agreement. K. LOLE, P. PILKINGTON, D. RUSHTON
with a given language group (as assertors), with But this is the maxim of shallow analysis which
a high degree of ideological formalization on is a poor teaching maxim and is of little use for
axiomatized shared beliefs it's going to be assessing our own beliefs.)
better to look for interconnections between More important than the relation between
audiences with a similar degree of axiomatized propositions and the persons asserting them'°
beliefs. That is, not look for strict factual is that between the statement and its audience.11
audiences for our beliefs, other than ourselves. Perelman makes this the main distinction 'Terms are mostly taken from Jaakko Hintikka,
`Modes of Modality' from 'Models for Modalities',
We can only expect (probably) a high degree of between classical formal logic and any (Reidel) 1969.
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