Page 46 - Studio International - May 1971

in some circumstances (not specified here)) This problem is not just found in the context of bundles of qualities. But this raises a lot of
(etc.) may be regarded as an event or object negative existentials (the famous 'King of problems (Humean ones) about substance
having a specific form. This refers to (directly) France is bald' statement (or non-statement) is concepts. The trouble is that the empiricist
an object. Frege holds that the 'idea' is wholly an example of this). One can obviously infringe tradition is too picturesque in its dealings with
subjective. Intensional objects lie, for Fregeans, the so-called laws of logic, but it would be a bit substance concepts. The point is that substance
somewhere between the object and the idea silly to start proliferating 'spaces' at this stage. is not hidden behind its accidents : accidents are
(of it). This distinction corresponds to the It would be argued, following the theory of forms of substance. This is a way of avoiding
traditional one between extensional objects and descriptions, that every general description of individualization by inherence. From a
intensional objects. the form 'the so and so' is in itself 'meaningless'. Thomistic standpoint, this empiricist attitude
The problem of identity of art objects is the This view might be taken if one can avoid to the ontological structure of 'objects' is
reason that one posits a special level of descriptions. The way this is done is well inadequate for the further reason that apart
intensional objects apart from extensional ones. known. Positing the equivalent conjunction of from the accidental forms of a substance, there
A second reason for a distinction between sentences in which no description occurs plays is also the substantial form of a thing. There are
extensional objects and intensional ones is that an important part in allowing coherent discourse some unusual ways of disposing of the
it helps uphold the so-called principle of and consideration of entities (or non entities) `unknowable' substance : not 'things' but
extensionality. According to this, a theoretical with which there is no 'direct acquaintance'. phenomenal qualia such as experienced redness
compound is about the same object where there The device of contextual definition is a specific etc. are to be regarded as individuals of a
are two 'signs' occurring in it with the same mode of access to intensional entities. A definition constructual system. So might indications of
`extension'. There are, however, contexts may be regarded as a kind of analysis. Here, one is positions in the visual field etc. It is easy to get
where extensionality is somewhat fraught. not concerned with the demonstration of an confused in systems like these over generality.
These are the so called 'opaque' contexts. There irreducible basic element nor with explicit The phenomenal qualia would in certain
is here the alternative of saying that the reduction or construction. The theory of circumstances be called general—e. g.
principle of extensionality does not hold or that descriptions rendered untenable the argument identically the same quale can occur in X's
the signs of the theoretical context do not refer that a special domain of 'sense' must be posited experience of that sculpture ( ?) and that
in the extensional sense—in these contexts, one in order to fill the space brought about by the painting ( ?).
would say that there is some 'reference' to an absence, at least of direct reference. What this means is that one is in trouble with
intensional object. (It is worth noting that these A self-consistent theory of intensional and respect to a 'work's' (`object's' in the sense of
opaque contexts are only accessible at a extensional objects is quite complex. The III) generality. The point is that in this system,
descriptive level—at a quasi metalinguistic question nonetheless remains how one can the fact that sculpture 'a' and painting 'b' are
level—e.g. the contexts analogous to those resolve the difficulty of identity. An identification both red (both the same colour) is conceived in
where one says what someone said etc.) By is not just the specification of a semantic rule. terms of 'the same quale (the same individual)
positing intensional objects, then, it may be But it can be got rid of by expunging is a member of two different classes'—not by
argued that the extensionality principle is more description. saying that the sculpture and the painting fall
or less upheld unrestrictedly. (Cf. Alonso The argument is that the sentences of a under the same universal. There is no individual
Church's system—where a new series of theory refer if they say anything about anything; in the system which could fall under the same
expressions is introduced in order to refer to and not about intensional objects accessible in quale. But the quales themselves are subsumed
the intensional object required.) terms of it. The theory of descriptions excluded under genera and are interrelated. Such genera
It has been argued that whereas the concept intensional objects as intermediary between the are general even in this type of system. And
of extensionality is easily accepted intuitively, terms of a theory and designata. But it is terms' classes (or sets) are platonistically general :
that of intensionality is not. The intensional intensions that are excluded rather than those of therefore things which ordinarily are considered
object has been said to contain 'the mode of semiotic strings. And here we get to the as concrete individuals, but which appear in this
presentation of an object'. difficulties about propositions—quite clearly, Russellian system, ascertain classes of qualia;
One may see in ontological pluralism the without inconsistency at all—a semiotic string not are in the system of generality.
ground for the admissibility of analysis, and surprisingly has semantical relations which are Anyone's stuff which is to be 'read' in some
certain ontological standpoints in the theory of different from those of its constituents. way—and invites naturalism—is severely
art may well be grounded broadly, for their But the suggestion that any 'work of art' is aggravated by class-theory antinomies — 'art
plausibility, on a notion of relational 'facts'. essentially propositional—or in some other sense theory' is any way. The antinomy affects all
This would involve setting up a resolution of propositional—may meet with certain objections discourse, but it specifically fouls up the
relational signification and relations. At this (i.e. that the proper matter for a theory of art is semantics which might be proffered in the
stage, it would perhaps be inappropriate to intensional entities). `context of art-talk'. This is the antimony of the
consider the drawbacks of phenomenological The point is that someone might want to deny class of classes which are not members of
analysis, yet the 'content'/`object' distinction is these apparently metaphysical entities as themselves. The notion of a class being a
one which is tacitly hinted at here and there. It properly accessible to a theory of art. This would member (or not a member) of itself may not at
may be more appropriate to set up a be to uphold physicalism, and every effort may first sight seem all that dubious. But is a certain
constructional system on a minimal basis. In be made to mention solely material objects and class of sculptures a sculpture ?; or the class of
the context of theory, the notion that every to correlate works of art only with physical `art objects' (or the virtual class, as will appear
single term carries existential import, carries a entities. later), assuming you can have such classes, itself
lot of problems with it. This notion is attached, The question is raised how, if you are going an art object ? There would be a certain amount
at least historically, to the view that all to, can one develop a semantics in this context of doubt about this. As an immediate consequence
`knowledge must be based on direct experience'. free of antinomies. This may be realized, on one of this one has to be pretty careful about
(Negative existential statements present these view, by making a continual distinction between assuming classes. Russell opted for a no-class
problems.) One answer to the problem might theory and 'object'. This need not invoke a theory : instead of dealing with the question
be that the non-existing must somehow be: correspondence between thing and concept, but concerning problematic entities, one can show
this presumably corresponds to the (initially) instead set up a parallel between an object how to avoid them. The contextual definition
Brentanian 'intentional inexistence'. One context and one which is about that context. for class concepts may be based on the fact that
suggestion has been that one could posit a One may argue that 'objects' or 'things' may between classes and properties, there is a one/
sphere of 'being' in addition to that of 'existing'. be viewed in the empiricist tradition—as many correlation. Every property determines a
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