Page 48 - Studio International - May 1971

as not susceptible to analysis. The clumsiness of customary in semantics)' is consistent. But it that (a) they are 'uninteresting' or that (b) it is
the proliferation is obvious-a different one will might lead to a proliferation of theory levels always done. The problem is to handle 'the
be needed for each assertion. The next question which finally would suggest naturalism. The works' or Theories of Ethics not as Austinian
is, how does one do one's analysis (definition), if kinds of rules needed for 'that . . .' contexts (or, `somethings' in the world (naturalistic) but as
they are not seen in this way. One suggestion even `so that') would have to provide an intensional. (This latter does not need the
might be that some are sorted (analysed) some- `inscriptional' account of 'logical' equivalence, positivist semanticist's `rider' fictitious'.) One
how in terms of others. One might then say whatever the basis of that 'logic'. If on the other can get this approach working by pointing out
that a whole locution on the basis of the elements hand one presupposes a syntax based upon that a 'maniere de parler' need not be just
prescribed is meaningful only if the finite `expression shapes' (this is a syntax of, or Russellian. The definability problem, and the
conjunction (or class) of premisses fulfils the basically associated with, the Carnap/Tarski need to solve it in an appropriate metatheory
criteria of stating the theory (or making the syntax), one can go to a notion of a priori using and maniere de parler just means that one is not
assertion) with reference to 'it is immoral . . . Platonistic devices, and from these to presupposing 'naturalism'. One could say that
etc.' (i.e. a moral statement). What kind of `equivalence' -of the required sort. This will the 'wider context' affords a hermeneutic,
suggestion might this be then ? One could ask if sort out the a-priority of 'the work' in a way though this might not be at all 'conventional'.
it is a 'logical consequence' of the prescription rather different than Kosuth did. To avoid this A question might be raised, what are the
of a rule of 'meaningfulness' in the art theory (keeping faith with nominalism, and it starts to proprieties of the 'maniere de parler' (i.e. that in
(metatheory) ? Anyway it is up the scale-it's in get a bit fraught as nominalism) one might relation to naturalism) and metatheory and
the meta-metatheory (meta art theory anyway, have to take this equivalence as a special kind of intensional entities (no more than this is
outside that initial art-theory framework), and analyticity as non-analysable in the form of a vast presupposed) ? That art works are, or can be
it can't be only a rule (and not possibly not a amount (multiplicity) of 'that . . .' (even, anti-naturalistic (and this is to say more than that
rule) of the context incorporating the 'states positivistically 'has the effect . . .', or 'looks their own source of a-priority is their own source
(or 'asserts that . . .') talk. as . . .', rather than 'is . . .'). But this would of `reality'), and in this sense intensional entities
This is pretty important since unless you are just be a way of avoiding a necessary unpacking. (this may be a way of saying that they might
given some rules (or at least have some) In the second method-that involving the genuinely sustain a pseudo-Husserlian epoché),
governing the 'asserts that . . (notwithstanding `that's' - the traces of 'reference' (and hence, a is not generally recognized. The aestheticians
oratio recta situations), or, unless they are simple 'naturalistic' point of view) have been to and part-time pundits not only get nowhere in
characterized in some suitable alternative way, a large extent lost. And it is not the purpose this direction, they are mostly unaware that there
one can't sort out, or at least one is not told, what specifically of this model to deliver up great is such a direction to go in. It is obvious that if
the supposed theory concerning them is like or insights into a realm of 'that's'. But it might be they (manière(s) de parler etc.) (or it) are (is)
is. thought that one could, for this purpose, just as identified with propositions (or with some sort
The second suggestion is as follows: So as to easily have selected 'states that' etc. So 'that' is of proposition) the 'intensional' status comes
avoid the 'reference' problem-that is to avoid just arbitrary. The point is that the `thats' are out fairly well. Even if one doesn't have
reference to 'art object Theory of Ethics'-one eliminable just as the 'theory' is (or the 'art work', `propositions' (and it's fairly clear that one
constructs a sort of operator which is predicate- with suitable modifications to the scheme, is) doesn't, just like that, without sorting-out what
forming producing a non-relational predication and this is a view which is as strongly anti- sort of proposition one might need) one still has
of theories (moral assertions). 'That . . .' is a Hegelian (in relation to 'art') as you could get. In to recognize the intensional status of 'art works'
non-relational predication on theories and the second method it seems that you have got rid and one also needs to recognize the historical
assertions (thinking now of one's theory as no of 'states' or 'asserts' talk (perhaps also (and hence a priori) requirement to get around
more than sentential); and to say that a theory is `interpretation', in the sense that you could `naturalism'. (Cf. Kosuth, 'Art after Philosophy',
a 'that it is . . .' is to go in one direction toward substitute 'interprets the theory (or assertion) Studio International, October/November 1969.)
solving the problem which is posed by those that . . .' for 'states the theory that . . .' and The idea of, and use of, the 'maniere de
who want to 'refer' to 'the work'. (The term end up with a similar result). Although the 'that' parler' comes out of Russell's writing on
`work' is historically recondite enough to be left is supposed to be fairly 'ordinary' it isn't clear descriptions. One can use this in a way and stay
as it is; one surely does not need to prescribe the that it should be, due to the use made of clear of the ontology of Russell. Russell defined,
bibliography having gotten this far.) The 'makes equivalence 'a priori' (that would be better than in context, phrases like 'the one and only x such
the assertion that . . .' or 'that . . .' sentences `logical'). That a (e.g.) sentence is equivalent that -x-', where in place of -x-' one puts
are just those which are 'logically' equivalent to might not be a general ground for regarding it in some sentential function, containing 'x' as its
the theory (assertion). It has been hinted earlier all cases as being just that which provides the only free variable. Such phrases are regarded -
that the 'that . . .' might be regarded as the basis of (or is the same as) a statement 'that . . as manières de parler within the wider sentential
class of sentences logically equivalent to the (This, of course, may be so just in a context of context (although one could do a lot about
assertion-`theory'-but it has been rejected formal or constructivist semantics, but not here; extending 'sentential' here) in which they occur.
because of the abstract ontology involved. The one cannot presuppose the lack of apophasis etc. It might also be said that even though one
initial class of sentences (or other elements) here.) In the second method, one has lost sight was not ontologically committed to a 'thing' (in
logically equivalent (and here one can of the finite conjunction of 'premisses' or moral Russell 'the one so-and-so' is taken as 'the value
presuppose a 'logic' which will make out an `premisses'. Now it might be argued that a of a variable'-and in Quire's ontology that's
equivalence on some basis) to the assertion is not `proposition' can be regarded as a class or a enough), it might still imply an 'understanding'
objectionable in this way. `virtual class' of equivalent strings -sentences - or rule for it which may or may not be definitive
One gets the 'effect of reference', or of or, syntactically coherent strings. And that in 'the wider context'. (And this has to be open
`naturalism', in this sense if one construes 'that equivalence is supposed to be 'logical'. Now to a hermeneutic-even just as 'recoil of the text',
. . .' is a predicate applying to every logical `that (. . .)', in effect, functions as 'standing' for thus one is not just singling out immutable
equivalent of the theory (or set of assertions, or such a class or virtual class. If this is so, then it 'anti-naturalism'.)
whatever), inclusive of the theory (etc.). Now, seems one is making an illicit identification of The semantical metalanguages based on
the theory that you can make the whole thing `works' (or, specifically, Theories of Ethics) with denotation (for first-order 'object languages and
explicitly concrete if you regard, for example, propositions. theories') have been characterized in detail (e.g.
sentences and expressions as 'inscriptions', or, Now because one can show that 'the works' Russell, Carnap, etc.) presumably to indicate
`expression events', rather than as abstract are `eliminable'-that is to say one does not have their adequacy for the 'explaining sciences', etc.
shapes or expression designs (as is more to be 'objective' or, `naturalistic'- does not mean But a strong theory holding with the many kinds