Page 36 - Studio International - October 1970
P. 36
A question of Ian Burn and Mel Ramsden
Soft-Tape 1966
epistemic 2 From Six Negatives 1968-9
adequacy 3 From Mirror Piece 1967
4 Mirror Piece 1967
Ian Burn, Mel Ramsden
It is initially the intention to offer some that which occurs by directly apprehended occurs in a manner similar to the identification
measure of adequacy of knowledge in analysing experience, i.e. it occurs in the primary of an instance of a chair as of the class 'chair'.
several familiar models or examples. This language. A characteristic of a basic proposition The proposition that 'this (paint, canvas, etc.)
analysing may entail a certain amount of is that it is known independently of inference is a painting' can readily be argued as empirically
re-definition in terms of our coming to know from other propositions, though not verifiable since it might as well be stated as
that the object being analysed ought to be independently of evidence (i.e. it must be `this (paint, canvas, etc.) is an artwork of the
analysed as such. Such consideration will be caused by some sensible occurrence). 1 The class which is determined by the stated
given to (i) artworks of a conventional nature evidence by which it is known is the evidence characteristics, paint, canvas, etc.'. This holds
(paintings and sculpture), (ii) the 'ready-made' for its truth. The sentence then 'this is an out a possible sense of 'knowing' a painting to
as an artwork, and finally (iii) the application artwork' could be inferred from the sentence be a painting which is non-verbal (and which
and implications of a 'theory of art'. The third `this is a painting', so it is the latter which must would seem a necessary part of an adequate
model, it will be argued, is a viable (and be studied as the basic propositional form of knowledge of a painting), so the sentence 'this
significant) break from the methods of (i) and p". (One is of course assuming for all instances is a painting' would be an assertion in the
(ii) in that it may assume responsibility for its that 'a painting is never not an artwork'.) The primary language. It does not seem however
own epistemology—so its adequacy or otherwise inference is not all that clear though, since that this would be a necessary condition of all
is no longer a matter of its presentation and while 'this is a painting' can be said to be a paintings; but it is a condition of some paintings.
interpretation, but is entailed within its statement about the identity of an object, it In the same vein, not all sentences in the
methodology. has not been established whether we ought to primary language can be said to describe a
If we posit the sentence 'this is an artwork' say this about 'this is an artwork'. It may be single experience, though some do. The word
in several models, we can examine the mode of better to let it rest at this : in the instance of `painting' involves condensing of many
proposition and its meaning occurring in each `p1', it is presumed as standing for a statement inductions, though by no means need they be
case. The word 'this' will serve (loosely) as the about identity in so far as it is covertly standing conscious or deliberate (—that it would
character of a proper name, in the sense that it for 'is an artwork of the type "painting"'. If necessarily be 'an artwork' is one induction),
designates without any degree of describing. one agrees so far, that there are instances of the so the word need not be claimed to describe a
One point which should be elicited is how this word 'painting' occurring in the primary single experience. This line of reasoning will
sentence may be capable in different instances language, then our knowing a painting must in lead to a primary language which can be
of expressing essentially different propositions these instances be empirical. (This then is a defined psychologically as well as logically.
(and hence different meanings). In a paradigm distinction whereby the word 'artwork' can Thus not all usages of the sentence can be
of traditional artwork (painting or sculpture), never occur in the primary language in 'p1", based on direct perception (again loosely)
the question might arise as to whether the since here it has the appearance of being the since in many instances a Gestalt-perception is
sentence (`this is an artwork', here 'pl') is in name of a class in which the instances of involved (particularly, for example, when one is
any degree a statement of empirical knowledge painting form a sub-class.) So, for those dealing with an instance of a well-known
(i.e. is a basic proposition). A basic proposition instances of painting which are identified painting). To guarantee the appropriate
is a sub-class of epistemological premisses- strictly on empirical grounds, the identification behaviour of a spectator, it has seemed merely
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