Page 36 - Studio International - October 1970
P. 36

A question of                                                                         Ian Burn and Mel Ramsden
                                                                                          Soft-Tape 1966
      epistemic                                                                           2 From Six Negatives 1968-9

      adequacy                                                                            3 From Mirror Piece 1967

                                                                                          4  Mirror Piece 1967
      Ian Burn, Mel Ramsden






































      It is initially the intention to offer some   that which occurs by directly apprehended   occurs in a manner similar to the identification
      measure of adequacy of knowledge in analysing   experience, i.e. it occurs in the primary   of an instance of a chair as of the class 'chair'.
     several familiar models or examples. This   language. A characteristic of a basic proposition   The proposition that 'this (paint, canvas, etc.)
      analysing may entail a certain amount of   is that it is known independently of inference   is a painting' can readily be argued as empirically
      re-definition in terms of our coming to know   from other propositions, though not   verifiable since it might as well be stated as
      that the object being analysed ought to be   independently of evidence (i.e. it must be   `this (paint, canvas, etc.) is an artwork of the
      analysed as such. Such consideration will be   caused by some sensible occurrence). 1  The   class which is determined by the stated
      given to (i) artworks of a conventional nature   evidence by which it is known is the evidence   characteristics, paint, canvas, etc.'. This holds
      (paintings and sculpture), (ii) the 'ready-made'   for its truth. The sentence then 'this is an   out a possible sense of 'knowing' a painting to
     as an artwork, and finally (iii) the application   artwork' could be inferred from the sentence   be a painting which is non-verbal (and which
     and implications of a 'theory of art'. The third   `this is a painting', so it is the latter which must   would seem a necessary part of an adequate
      model, it will be argued, is a viable (and   be studied as the basic propositional form of   knowledge of a painting), so the sentence 'this
     significant) break from the methods of (i) and   p". (One is of course assuming for all instances   is a painting' would be an assertion in the
      (ii) in that it may assume responsibility for its   that 'a painting is never not an artwork'.) The   primary language. It does not seem however
      own epistemology—so its adequacy or otherwise   inference is not all that clear though, since   that this would be a necessary condition of all
      is no longer a matter of its presentation and   while 'this is a painting' can be said to be a   paintings; but it is a condition of some paintings.
      interpretation, but is entailed within its   statement about the identity of an object, it   In the same vein, not all sentences in the
      methodology.                              has not been established whether we ought to   primary language can be said to describe a
        If we posit the sentence 'this is an artwork'   say this about 'this is an artwork'. It may be   single experience, though some do. The word
      in several models, we can examine the mode of   better to let it rest at this : in the instance of   `painting' involves condensing of many
      proposition and its meaning occurring in each   `p1', it is presumed as standing for a statement   inductions, though by no means need they be
      case. The word 'this' will serve (loosely) as the   about identity in so far as it is covertly standing   conscious or deliberate (—that it would
      character of a proper name, in the sense that it   for 'is an artwork of the type "painting"'. If   necessarily be 'an artwork' is one induction),
      designates without any degree of describing.   one agrees so far, that there are instances of the   so the word need not be claimed to describe a
      One point which should be elicited is how this   word 'painting' occurring in the primary   single experience. This line of reasoning will
      sentence may be capable in different instances   language, then our knowing a painting must in   lead to a primary language which can be
      of expressing essentially different propositions   these instances be empirical. (This then is a   defined psychologically as well as logically.
      (and hence different meanings). In a paradigm   distinction whereby the word 'artwork' can   Thus not all usages of the sentence can be
      of traditional artwork (painting or sculpture),   never occur in the primary language in 'p1",   based on direct perception (again loosely)
      the question might arise as to whether the   since here it has the appearance of being the   since in many instances a Gestalt-perception is
     sentence (`this is an artwork', here 'pl') is in   name of a class in which the instances of   involved (particularly, for example, when one is
      any degree a statement of empirical knowledge   painting form a sub-class.) So, for those   dealing with an instance of a well-known
      (i.e. is a basic proposition). A basic proposition   instances of painting which are identified   painting). To guarantee the appropriate
      is a sub-class of epistemological premisses-   strictly on empirical grounds, the identification    behaviour of a spectator, it has seemed merely
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