Page 37 - Studio International - October 1970

necessary for the artist to follow prescriptions
for selecting, handling and presenting his
materials. Crudely this might be described as :
the terms in which such an artist works are
occurring in the primary language. Such
prescriptions have exerted the fundamental
appearance of all paintings onto each particular
instance of painting; appearance being the
normative criterion for knowing it to be this
particular kind of artwork, then these
prescriptions amount to the criteria for a
sub-class of artworks.
Tarski showed that the words 'true' and
`false' cannot occur in the object-language;
these words will always require a language of a
higher order [i.e. (n + th]. This does not
mean that sentences in the primary language are
neither true nor false, but that, if 'q' stands for
the sentence in the primary language 'this is a
painting', then the sentences 'q is true' and
is false' are occurring in the secondary language.
Russell's principle is that, if there is to be a
primary language, its words must not be such
that they presuppose the existence of language. that in actual experience such reasoning would painting entails (in definition) that it also be a
Since the sentence 'this is a painting' has been not happen like that; the perception and (kind of) artwork. But let us examine a model
under certain circumstances ascertained as association would be as immediate as possible. which is more paradoxical—the notion of the
belonging to the primary language, in what The subsequent acknowledgement (connection) `ready-made' and the application of the sentence
manner might it be claimed a veridical assertion ? as an artwork is the only dialectical association `this is an artwork' (here `p2'). When initially
Though we can make assertions in the primary here. Though G. E. Moore would likely argue proposed, a painting was not selected for the
language, we cannot say of the assertions that otherwise, that we could not know it was a `ready-made' object and for a good reason—it
they are true or false in this language. A painting without also knowing it was an was necessary that the object used did not
distinction about the usage of the word artwork, particularly from the sense of his adhere to the conventional prescriptions for a
`assertion' has been pointed out by Russell: he assertion that it is possible to know, and know type of artwork.2 From this standpoint, the
explains that, as it is sometimes used, for certain, that a proposition is true without conventional norm (p0 would be interpreted as
`assertion' is the antithesis of denial and in this knowing its analysis.) Thus, for a status as an `this has the appearance of a (kind of) artwork,
sense cannot occur in the primary language. artwork which is granted through empirical then it is an artwork'. Whereas the ready-made
Denial presupposes language; the word 'not' evidence, questioning of such a status is alleged 'this does not have the appearance of
is only significant when attached to a sentence, doubting the veridicality of one's perceptions an artwork but, by catering to certain other
it has no meaning when attached to a physical (or one's application of a learned language). conditions, this can be asserted as an artwork'.
object. A confusion may occur when the same Hence, it is implicit in the question: does this There seems to be a consistency about 'the
form of a sentence occurs in the primary have the appearance of a painting ? And so, object' and 'how it occurred' when the object
language in one instance and in a secondary extensively : an object which has the appearance had conventional references (even if that
language in another—such differences ought of a painting, but is not a painting ... must be consistency was deriving merely from
not be overlooked. The assertion which is the antinomous of logical laws as surely as of genealogical associations—so that the given
antithesis of denial belongs to the secondary common sense (i.e. a virtual 'round square'). identity sprang from associative relations of the
language; the assertion which belongs to the There may be some case for the argument event). But, in the given case, for example, of a
primary language has no antithesis. Then that the sentence `p1' is an analytic judgement bottlerack being held out as an artwork, there
when I am confronted with an object which has (or proposition), particularly if one accepts is an obvious inconsistency, if not plain
every appearance of being a painting (so that it Kant's terms that analytic judgements are those contradiction. There is no normality about the
does not occur to me to question it), how in which the connection of the predicate with association of 'the object' and 'how it occurs'
plausible is raising the questions : 'Is this a the subject is conceived through identity, while in `p2', although we do hold some strong
painting ?' or 'Is this not a painting ?' (the others, in which the connection is conceived notions about how a bottlerack usually occurs.
logical forms of which stand 'Is the sentence without identity, may be called synthetic. For Kant, it would certainly stand as a synthetic
"this is a painting" true ?' etc.). Instead I am (While Kant restricted his usage to the proposition in that what it predicated has no
perceiving that, since the object has all the Aristotelian classification of propositions, connection with the identity of the subject. A
appearances of a painting, then that amounts to recent usage has extended its application to bottlerack, under this principle, is what it is
my criterion for calling it a painting. (Except other kinds of propositions.) The identity of a —and, in a logical order, this must be
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