Page 38 - Studio International - October 1970

maintained to preserve the meaning of the term.
We hold a distinct notion of 'bottlerack' (as
we also hold, though more loosely, a notion of
`artwork'), then to assert that a bottlerack no
longer has an identity as a bottlerack is absurd
to an extreme. Thus we have an object 'X'
which is predicated as (i) a bottlerack, and (ii)
an artwork—which on the surface must appear
as incompatible predicates. Contrary to this,
5
134
an argument could be given that they are not while (i) is obviously a statement relating to
incompatible since what is predicated is not identity, (ii) does not introduce identity
[(i) (—whether then there would be any advantage
(ii)], but that either (i) is predicated, or
(ii) is predicated, and not simultaneously. This to terming it 'a statement of objective
premiss has lead to some fairly developed (but intentionality' is dubious; it seems as though
tedious) games of interchangeability and it could not get off the ground). I am avoiding
transposition ( ... perhaps this is 'what art is all saying that (ii) has some meaning in terms of 'a
about' ?). Alternately, a more plausible, though function', since this returns to a kind of
less distinctive, reasoning could maintain that operationalism in which identity is granted
strictly on function. If 'this is an artwork' is
claimed in 'p2' as not a statement about
identity, then one can posit (i) and (ii) are not
incompatible (there is no hint of introducing an
`excluded middle') and thus could be posited
simultaneously
(a) [(X is e.g. a bottlerack) is an artwork].
This is fine as far as it goes, but it is only
partial since its meaning as 'an artwork' is not
explicit in merely placing terms, but instead in
considering the whole assertion. As it stands,
at least one term is occurring in the material—
but 'the artwork' is not up for consideration
as 'the artwork' in the material (primary) mode
at any stage (and this does not deny visual
aspects). It is not simply a bottlerack being
considered as 'an artwork', but its meaning lies
in the consideration of this proposition as 'an
artwork'. Hence we need the additional
(b) {[(X is e.g. a bottlerack) is an artwork]
is an artwork}
or, more simply,
(c) [(this is an artwork) is an artwork]
where 'this' holds vestiges of separate identity.
And then if one wants to give 'this' an even
wider denotation and simply append the
predicate 'is an artwork', it would be
exemplary how different things are expressed
by the same sentence in different instances of
usage. The application of the term 'artwork'
does not imply any standardized or normative
meaning but instead relates to a hierarchy of
meanings occurring along the many strata of
language. An adequacy for knowing something
to be an artwork should entail also knowing
which application and which particular
meaning.
The final model is perhaps on first
appearances a tenuous one, not in terms of what
it constitutes, but simply on applicability.
Such that—what application can the sentence
`this is an artwork' have to something which is
standing as a 'theory of art' ? In The
Grammarian3, it was raised that 'an extended
notion of artwork' would have to be entailed if
a 'theory of art' was to beg the application of
'artwork'—this was certainly an open-ended
approach though only partially conclusive. A
hazard lies here in intentional or unintentional
attempts to find a basis to reify language.
And claims that a 'theory of art' is merely
another kind of ready-made cannot be
supported from either a logical or commonsense
basis, as will be shown.
In so far as it may explicate, we can regress
to establish some sense of an intermediary
point. In the above propositions for the
ready-made, if in (b) we were to substitute the