Page 71 - Studio International - December 1973
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ART THEORY& PRACTICE
epistemic world be ? That is, how can we have a opens up immense depth problems of the Quantification will be limited to one nodal point
generalized logic approaching the Reich des formal language in a similar fashion to the depth of that grammar/sorted out context/set
Sollens ? Dealing with approximate equivalents structure problems of natural languages. The conditions for each basic type taken as a point
through sets, through indexing, materializing, pragmatics of natural languages and the formal of reference, an entity quantified into an opaque
etc., inasmuch as these are then directly related pragmatic languages are very close as far as the context. That degree of rigorousness would be
to one's notion of context (in fact is constructed number of parameters that are constructed to absurd, rather the synthetic a priori
out of the above notions), then how can an make up an individual (in a sense, cross refer) as characteristics of projection rules. Non-
epistemic world produce contexts which a member or non-member of a set (usually an arbitrary conditions allow for an approximation
presumably are supposed to map ideology ? ordered pair) is produced for a pragmatic to a fairly deep, hermeneutic grammar for the
They can do so only in so far as separate interpretation of a semantic reading of a set (or generation of phrase structure, etc., etc., a la
mappings are made between the epistemic whatever), such as language-user to language, Chomsky/Katz (or a list of pre-requisites
closure conditions, defensibility. A lot of the etc. (Richard Montague is certainly better and approximating an intensional logic).
stuff on the KK business was related in a certainly points a way towards bringing the An address to the social problem is, 'what are
terribly weak historical way to a Socratic Indexes of Documenta and the Hayward show the ideological relations and what are the
tradition of introspection, which is fine as long in a closer relation to the seemingly discrete teleological relations, and what degree of
as one recognizes that in the search for how KK Katz/Apostel/Chomsky lexicon.) symmetry does one have between those two
may be interpreted, KKI (say) is predicated Contexts of use of all complexes of relevant relations ?' or, 'what are the possibilities of
only of Socrates. Another foundational problem aspects of possible contexts of use, we may call symmetry, agreement, acceptance, obligation,
is that the relative deontic logic providing the such complexes indices, or, to borrow Scott's permission ?'
conditions of KKI is relative to the quasi- term, points of reference. This is where the Concepts are directly related to the notion of
member of a set. So, revision may not be the connection is between grammar (the lexicon) the individual members of a set such that
best word. 'Discovery', perhaps ? This is a form and logic (-al space of indexing), i.e. between (a) pep, and so whatever machinery a proposition
of study. the selection restrictions of a depth grammar may require, there are so many nested situations
We say something like 'we are trying to dictionary, and (b) the propositional attitudes of and so many series of nestings that the point is
discover/evaluate what we are doing when we the indexes. With (a) the restrictions appear perhaps not only knowing when or how to start,
enter into dialogue with other (quasi) members (are in fact) conditions for sets inasmuch as but also how to stop. (N. B. the set may be of an
of Art & Language, if that discourse of Art & indexical entries will each have semantic epistemic logic, deontic logic, or any other logic
Language does manage to suppose some sort features running down the page as a branching operating over the ordered members.) And so
of dialogue'. This is not excuses. Quite the or non-branching pathway. We could say that we are even questioning our own
contrary. We don't have defensibility, i.e. where semantic features of two indexical instrumentalities. That's a reflection on one's
membership of a group, in the situation of a entries match they are embedded into one set as teleology/deontology, and the deontic bit comes,
dialogue/discourse where intensional or a part of that synthetic a priori grammar (logic). perhaps, as a question/realization of the
intensive sets come up as a mapping procedure The usage of sets is borrowed from the general rationality problem, or the Carnap and Bayes
or as a research programme. It's presumably as literature of (b) above, but this is going on a bit situation where one looks at one's
simplistic as that eventually. It's a logical about something that's only speculative. instrumentalities, one's arbitrariness, etc., as a
problem before and after the methodological However, the reduction of atomic types from shared and common epistemic position.
problems of Art & Language (and anyone else), the propositions (cf. Hintikka's) related to an
i.e. the socio-cultural, linguistic, grammatical, individual (etc., etc.) to the simpler morphemes IV
etc. problems are rooted in the problems of a of Katz and Chomsky reflects the unhappy We were really asking whether the decision,
logic of dialogue/discourse (e.g. implicature state of the studies of propositional attitudes among other things, to deal with the lexemes
(cf. Grice) rather than strict implication). All of (cf. Indexes at the Hayward Gallery and that we ended up dealing with was a structural
this is in a way an attempt at an orthodoxy for Documenta). decision and not a product of an arbitrary
Art & Language discourse, texts (or anybody The problem of inference is between what as atomism. The suggestion about the annotated
else's discourse, etc.), but also, perhaps, an basic types ? Answering that may go far enough (social problem) project was that it might be
attempt to affirm that given the phenomena or to make acceptable the speculation that given dialectical proceeding, and then we had a
the ostension (say) of what appears as language, simple types as products of a complex of question of the 'gross aspect', and we decided in
and so as discourse, it really does contain some functions/operators/dimensions, then inference neither instance was there any reason to regard
non-phenomenological characteristics. is not going to take place, rather conjunctions the proceeding/activity as in any way radically
Let's make it clear that our uses of Montague that approximate an inference. But this is associated with the gross item of discourse, nor
or Hintikka are probably highly defiant to their supposing an extremely thorough grammar that radically associated with the minutiae thereof.
classic works (so that deals with contradiction in would be a foundation, of not a high quality There was a distinction between the textures of
set theories and dubious decision procedures for translation, but of the high quality translation. the gross list and the atomistic list which was
inclusion). Secondly, that we are involved in a Again, that would mean the grammar (like the (recursively) veering towards the quasi-
situation that's highly and reflexively logic) had projection rules for a generative molecular item, i.e. the 'lexicon'.
paradoxical, almost traditionally so, in trying to grammar that always satisfied or didn't satisfy We're still struggling with the anthropological
find a simple theory of types (and tokens), i.e. all the selection restrictions/distinguishers that business of having nothing to do, whether one's
there are so many logical problems associated one had and would possibly have. As far as the involved in a kind of discovery, i.e. seeing one's
with groups, sets and their individuals not just inference/implication issue is traditionally discourse in a sense as a kind of nature, and
as a formalism of a descriptive and evaluative dependent upon identity (as tautology) then to discovering certain nodes or other structurally
instrumentality, but also a natural language suspect an ambiguity over issues of ontology ascertainable items as special objects of scrutiny
adumbration of the topics, points of reference. would be missing the mark (ambivalence to the or something different from that. 'There are
Actually this point has been cheerfully ( ?) made subject of ontology, if any sense can be made of certain kinds of discourse . .. which have a
by those working in pragmatics and natural it on its own). Quite simplistically, where we semantical background which is different from
languages (R. L. Martin, Montague, etc.) by have an analogy between lexicons and logics, the others' . .. worrying about a choice between an
saying there's little difference between a formal projection rules or set conditions for semantics intensive and extensive mode of concentration.
pragmatic language as a language and a formal will only refer back to the original case in point/ We're in no position to distinguish a-
pragmatic language of language. That really sample of natural language a posteriori. prioristically between intensive and extensive
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